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Torts
BY RONALD L. GREEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
t has been some time since the last Torts Survey appeared on these
pages, and much has changed in the law of torts. Three trends are
evident. The first is that the Supreme Court of Kentucky continues
to be active in its willingness to expand tort liability The second is that the
court frequently has been willing to reverse itself in a short amount of time,
as will be documented below The absence of deference to the principle of
stare decisis has resulted in a lack of certainty in the law, making it
impossible for practitioners to advise clients with any certainty, which in
turn affects the decision whether to settle or litigate. Whether the redistn-
bution of wealth is worth the increased cost of the system is, however, a
largely political issue that will be left for another time. Third is a tendency
to confuse issues of duty and liability with comparative fault; the latter, of
course, presupposes a finding of fault and relates solely to the effect of any
negligence by the plaintiff.
II. WRONGFUL DEATH
While there was no cause of action for death at common law,' and early
attempts by the legislature to define such a cause of action were awk-
* Partner in the fimn of Boehl, Stopher & Graves, Lexington, Louisville,
Paducah, and Prestonsburg, at Lexington Office. J.D. 1980, University of
Kentucky.
'At common law claims for wrongful death were governed by the maxim actio
personalis moritur cum persona (a personal right of action dies with the person)
and accordingly an action in tort abated if the injured person or the tortfeasor died.
See Covington St.-Ry Co. v. Packer, 72 Ky. 455, 457 (1873). The death of a
human being could not be complained of as an injury in civil court except as
prescribed by statute. See Harms v. Kentucky Timber & Lumber Co., 43 S.W 462,
463 (Ky. 1897) (finding that a father did not qualify under the statutes to recover
for the death of his son).
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ward,2 the foundation for the present cause of action for wrongful death
was laid with the constitutional convention m 1891. 3 Beginning with its
incorporation into the state Constitution and until 1981, the nature and
scope of the cause of action was well settled. Since then, however, it has
undergone significant expansion by judicial fiat notwithstanding the fact
that the constitution places responsibility for the cause of action in the
hands of the legislature. The effect has been to increase the amount of
compensation payable m wrongful death cases.
A. Expansion of the Measure ofDamages
In 1981, the court of appeals rendered its opinion in Charlton v.
Jacobs,4 which has been applied so many times through the years without
2 The original statutes allowing recovery for wrongful death were derived form
Lord Campbell's Act of 1854, see Sturgeon v Baker, 227 S.W.2d 202,203 (Ky.
1950) (holding for the defendant because the widow and minor child did not prove
the homicide was committed maliciously and in self-defense), and were narrow in
scope. There were two primary statutes. General Statutes of Kentucky [hereinafter
GEN. ST.] 57 § 1 allowed recovery for the death of anyone who was not an
employee of the railroad against the proprietor of a railroad upon a showing of
negligence, punitive damages not being recoverable. Section 3 provided for
recovery of damages for death against any person upon a showing of willful
neglect, and upon such a showing punitive damages could be recovered. Cincinnati,
N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co. v Prewitt's Adm'r, 17 S.W 484 (Ky. 1891). The latter statute
was narrowly construed, such that recovery could only be had in the event the
decedent was survived by a widow or child. See Hackett v. Louisville, St. L. & T.P
Ry. Co., 24 S.W 871 (Ky. 1894) (concluding that a father could not recover
damages for the death of his seven-year-old child). The unconstitutionality of
section 1 and dissatisfaction with section 3 led to the incorporation of the cause of
action for wrongful death into the Constitution. See Passamaneck v. Louisville Ry.
Co., 32 S.W 620, 621-22 (Ky. 1895).
3 Section 241 of the Kentucky Constitution provides as follows:
Whenever the death of a person shall result from an injury inflicted by
negligence or wrongful act, then, in every such case, damages may be
recovered for such death, from the corporations and such persons so causing
the same. Until otherwise provided by law, the action to recover such
damages shall in all cases be prosecuted by the personal representative of
the deceased person. The General Assembly may provide how the recovery
shall go and to whom belong; and until such provision is made, the same
shall form part of the personal estate of the deceased person.
KY CONST. § 241.
4 Charlton v Jacobs, 619 S.W.2d 498 (Ky Ct. App. 1981).
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review that it is commonly thought to be the law in Kentucky However,
the opinion is not authoritative in Kentucky and was wrongly decided.
The Charlton case arose out of an automobile accident in which Ricky
Charlton was killed. Ajury awardedthe sum of $50,000.00 andboth parties
appealed.5 The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in allowing
evidence concerning the amount of the decedent's lost future earnings that
would have been consumed if he had lived, and that "consumed" portions
should not offset an award to the estate.6 The court presented two bases for
its opinion. First, the court relied on Professor Dobbs, whose view is based
on the fact that consumption is not mentioned in the jury instructions used
in a 1915 Kentucky case.7 In addition to Dobbs, the court cited West
Kentucky Coal Co. v. Shoulder's Adm'r,8 where the court also addressed
the requisites ofjury instructions.' The second basis for the court's opinion
5 See id. at 499.
6 See id. at 500-01. While most states base recovery for wrongful death on the
loss sustained by the survivors, Kentucky has consistently construed its statute to
be a "true" wrongful death statute m that recovery is based on the loss to the
decedent's estate. See, e.g., Empire Metal Corp. v. Wohlwender, 445 S.W.2d 685,
687 (Ky. 1969) (finding that the measure of damages should be calculated by
looking at "the destruction of the decedent's power to earn money," rather than
looking at whether a pecuniary loss was suffered).
7 Professor Dobbs states m DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES 556 n.3 (1973), that Kentucky is in the minority ofjurisdictions in not
allowing a set-off for personal consumption. He cites the case of Lexington Utility
Co. v. Parker's Administrator, 178 S.W 1173 (Ky 1915), which pertains only to
the form of the jury instruction. This view was picked up m STUART M. SPIESER,
RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 3.2 (2d ed. 1975). This misstatement of
Kentucky law likely originated with a student work, which Professor Dobbs cites
as a complete survey. See Note, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina, 44
N.C. L. REv 402,405 n. 17 (1966). Each of these authors either did not account for
or ignored the fact that Kentucky utilizes a "bare bones" approach to jury
instructions, see Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 429,433 (Ky.
1980), and thus the instruction does not set forth all relevant factors. See Cuniffe's
Ex'x v. Johnson, 132 S.W.2d 47 (1939). Therefore, the mere fact that the approved
jury instruction makes no reference to consumption is not determinative of whether
it is relevant. It should be noted that there is no mention of the so-called minority
rule in W PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
950 (5th ed. 1984).
' West Ky. Coal Co. v. Shoulders' Adm'r, 234 Ky 427,28 S.W.2d 479 (1930)
(finding that the jury instructions in an action for the wrongful death of a coal
miner were not prejudicial to employer).
9See Charlton, 619 S.W.2d at 500.
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was Louisville & NR.R. Co. v. Moms 'Adm "x. 'o However, the court failed to
recognize that Moris dealt with the wrongful death statute m effect before
189111 and that the court had declined to follow that statute when the new
(and present) cause of action for wrongful death was incorporated into the
Constitution.
A mere five years after the decision m Moms, but m the context of the
new Constitution, the court struggled with this very issue. Initially, the court
reaffirmed the Moms rule m Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Lang's Adm 'r"2 and
Louisville& NR.P Co. v. Kelly's Adm"x. 13 However, instead of establishing
the so-called minority view described by Professor Dobbs, these cases com-
menced a flurry of judicial debate. On May 1, 1897, the court rendered
opinions overruling petitions for rehearing in Lang's Adm'r 14 and Kelly's
AdmY'Ix that retracted portions of the original opnons, and specifically held
that thejury was authorized by the instruction to consider personal consump-
tion even though such was not set forth in the jury's instruction.
1 6
10 Louisville & N.R.R. Co. v. Moms' Adm'x, 20 S.W 539, 540 (Ky 1892)
(indicating that consideration of consumption was speculative, but holding only
that it should not be included in the jury instructions).
1 See id.
12 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Lang's Adm'r, 38 S.W 503, 504 (Ky 1896)
(following the rule established in Moms to not consider deduction of future living
expenses (consumption) when calculating damages).
13 Louisville & N.R.R. Co. v. Kelly's Adm'x, 38 S.W 852, 855 (Ky. 1897)
(following Morris and Lang's Adm "r).
14 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v Lang's Adm'r, 40 S.W 451, 452 (Ky 1897)
(modifying the portion of the lower court's opinion that declared that "it is the
earning power of the deceased, extended to the probable duration of his life, that
is the measure of damages").
"s Louisville & N.R.R. Co. v Kelly's Adm'x, 40 S.W 452, 453 (Ky. 1897)
(holding that the jury should not be instructed to consider decedent's life
expectancy, ability to earn money, and the duration of that ability).
16 See Lang's Adm r, 40 S.W at 451; Kelly's Adm 'x, 40 S.W at 453. In revising
its opinions, the court, at this early stage, clearly recognized that the "loss to the
estate" which formed the measure of damages included the concept of personal
consumption. Justice Du Relle wrote:
While we are of the opinion that the instruction "to find for the plaintiff in
such sum as you may believe from the evidence will reasonably and fairly
compensate the estate of James Kelly for the destruction of the power to
earn money" authorized the jury to consider all the evidence in the case,
and, if they were of the opinion that he would have no greater earning
capacity during the remainder of his life than at the time of his death, to
deduct from his gross earnings during his life expectancy such reasonable
[VOL. 86
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These opinions refute the "authorities" which base their view on the jury
instruction.
7
To place this issue in context, it should be noted that the effect of the
Charlton opinion, which disallowed offsetting awards with "consumed"
portions, would be that the measure of damages for death would involve no
more than a computation, that being the annual earnings of the decedent
multiplied by the life expectancy of the decedent. However, in Louisville
& N.R.R. Co. v. Eakns' Adm'r,1s the court specifically rejected a jury
instruction that embodied this concept because "all that it was necessary for
the jury to do to arrive at a verdict was to determine how much [the]
deceased was capable of earning in a year, and multiply that amount by his
expectation of life."19 The court explained its rejection of such an instruc-
tion as follows:
expenses as might be necessary, we do not think that this should have been
embodied in the instruction.
Kelly's Adm "x, 40 S.W at 452-53 (emphasis added). Any doubt concerning the
court's intent in tlus regard was removed in a second modification of the opinion
in Lang's Adm "r, wherein the court stated:
The petition for modification of the opinion suggests that there is some
doubt as to the meaning of the court in its statement of the measure of
recovery in an action for damages for death caused by negligence, the doubt
being as to whether the measure of recovery was the gross earnings of the
deceased or the net earnings continued for the probable duration of his life.
Our opinion was that the measure ofrecovery was such sum as wouldfairly
compensate the estate of the deceased for the destruction of his earning
power .Had the question of the sufficiency of the instruction been a new
one, we should have held that the jury ought to have been specifically
instructed in estimating the loss to the estate to take into consideration what
would have been the necessary and economical living expenses of the
deceased had he not been killed.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry Co. v Lang's Adm'r, 41 S.W 271, 271-72 (Ky 1897)
(emphasis added). The court went on to say that the instruction as given, even
though it did not mention consumption, authorized thejury to take into account all
the facts and circumstances.
17See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
'8Louisville & N.R.R. Co. v. Eakins' Adm'r, 45 S.W 529 (Ky 1898) (holding
that thejury should take into account the decedent's cost of living when calculating
damages).
"9 Id. at 532. The offending instruction stated that: "If the jury find for the
plaintiff, the measure of damages will be the capacity of deceased to earn money,
coupled with his expectation of life." Id.
TORTS
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This entirely leaves out of view the fact that deceased necessarily applied a
certain proportion of the money earned by him to ins own support. The true
measure of damages is not the capacity of the deceased to earn money, but
is such a sum as will reasonably compensate Is estate for the destruction of
his power to earn money; and, in arriving at the amount of this sum, the jury
are authorized to consider all the testimony in the case bearing on this
question.
20
Finally, the court confronted the issue head-on m Stewart's Adm'x v.
Louisville & N.R Co.,21 m. the context of a claim that an award was
inadequate, when it stated:
The value of a piece of machinery is not to be determined by multiplying its
present earning power by the length of its probable use, but the cost of
maintenance must be subtracted. The value of the human machine to his
estate must be determined in like manner. It must be maintained - that is, it
must be fed, clothed, and supplied with other necessities. Mhat the estate
would lose would be the net gain.22
In Cincinnati, N. 0. & T.P Ry. Co. v. Lovell's Adm 'r,2 the rule was phrased
201 Id. Any remaining doubt concerning the meaning of the holding in Ealans'
Adm'r should be resolved by reference to its two dissenting opinions by Justice
Guffy. See Louisville & N.R. Co. v Eakins' Adm'r, 46 S.W 496 (Ky. 1898);
Louisville & N.R. Co. v Eakins' Adm'r, 47 S.W 872 (Ky 1898). In the first,
Justice Guffy wrote:
The rule announced m the majority opinion in this case would always
prevent the recovery for any damages where the power of the decedent to
earn money was not greater than the amount necessary to defray his
expenses of living, or, in other words, to furnish him with food, raimant,
and shelter, and pay his taxes
Ealans' Adm'r, 46 S.W at 496. Justice Guffy continued to argue against the
majority view and advocate the holding in Charlton through the turn of the century.
See Louisville & N.R.R. Co. v Creighton, 50 S.W 227, 229 (Ky 1899). Finally,
in Southern Ry. Co. v. Evans' Adm'r, 63 S.W 445 (Ky 1901), Justice Guffy
reluctantly accepted the view of the majority, stating, "This court has held that a
jury might, if they see proper, take such things into consideration, but it has never
held that they ought to be instructed to consider such personal expense." Id. at 446.
Thus, 80 years before the decision in Charlton, there was consensus that the jury
could consider personal consumption in determining the estate's loss, and the only
argument was whether such consideration should be required by the instruction.
21 Stewart's Adm'x v Louisville &N.R.R. Co., 125 S.W 154 (Ky. 1910).
22Id. at 157 (emphasis added).
23Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry Co. v Lovell's Adm'r, 132 S.W 569 (Ky. 1910)
(affirming the jury's award for damages even though unusually large because the
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as: "The loss to his estate is the amount that he will probably make and
save if he should live the full limit of his expectancy of life."24
Thus, it is clear that the holding of the court of appeals m Charlton is
contrary to the established holdings of the high court m Kentucky As an
intermediate appellate court, the court of appeals simply does not have the
power to overrule this line of cases.15 While it is true that discretionary
review by the supreme court was sought and denied, this does not indicate
approval,26 particularly in a case such as this where the key cases were not
brought to the attention of either court.
B. Present Value
In Paducah Area Public Library v. Teny,27 the court of appeals
recognized that awards for future loss must be reduced to present value.2"
The court then held that the parties can be precluded, at the trial court's
jury was allowed to consider decedent's personality and physical traits).
24Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
2 Since the adoption of section 114 of the Kentucky Constitution, which
became effective in 1976, Kentucky has utilized a two-tiered appellate structure,
the highest court being the Supreme Court of Kentucky. Earlier, the high court was
known as the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. Under the current system, the court
of appeals is without authority to effect a change m Kentucky law. The rules of the
supreme court provide: "The Court of Appeals is bound by and shall follow
applicable precedents established in the opinions of the Supreme Court and its
predecessor court." KY. SUP CT. R. 1.030(8)(a). This principle is likewise well-
settled in the decisional law. See Louisville Trust Co. v Johns-Manville Prod.
Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1979) (noting that the court of appeals had to follow
case precedent until it was overruled by the supreme court); Borden v Litchford,
619 S.W.2d 715 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the court of appeals was bound
by the supreme court's decision concerning implied warranties); Thurman v
Commonwealth, 611 S.W.2d 803 (Ky Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing that the court
of appeals is bound by the state supreme court); Mackey v. Greenview Hosp., Inc.,
587 S.W.2d 249 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (declanng that the decision to overrule the
common law defense of contributory negligence would have to originate in the
state supreme court).
26 A Kentucky court rule provides that "[t]he denial of a motion for dis-
cretionary review does not indicate approval of the opinion or order sought to be
reviewed and shall not be cited as connoting such approval." KY SUP CT. R.
76.20(9)(2).27Paducah Area Pub. Library v Terry, 655 S.W.2d 19 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
28See id. at 24. While the case involved damages for personal injury rather than
death, the role of present value is the same.
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discretion, from offering evidence concerning present value. Although the
court's rule is pragmatic, it is not economically sound.29 The court reasoned
that because inflation and interest rates "offset" each other, a rule excluding
present value testimony would prevent battles of experts regarding interest
rates and future inflation. The court is only partially correct. It is true that
interest rates and inflation offset each other because interest rates encom-
pass expected price rises in the future. However, interest rates and general
price inflation are not the same thing. To say that inflation and interest rates
offset each other is to say that foregone consumption (i.e., saving) has no
present value or that money has no value over time, a fact that any lender
or borrower knows to be false. Further, if there were no difference between
inflation and interest rates, there would be no need for a rule reducing
awards to present value since present value in all cases, by definition,
present value would equal future value. The opinion indicated that this
holding was in part fueled by concern about battles of experts regarding
interest rates and future inflation.
While the court essentially held that such evidence is within the
common knowledge of a jury, it is also true that the jury has the ability,
without the aid of an economist, to determine life expectancy and multiply
that number by the earnings shown in the proof. Therefore, it would seem
logical that if a trial court wished to exclude evidence of present value, it
should exclude other economic testimony as well.
The trial court in Terry precluded not only cross-examination of the
defendant's expert economist as to present value, but also any other
demonstration by the defendant to the jury that the award should be
reduced to its present value.3° The opinion does not indicate whether the
defendant was allowed to argue present value to the jury, but many
practitioners read the case to foreclose such argument. No matter what the
ruling of a trial court is concerning the introduction of evidence, counsel
must be allowed to address the issue in opening and closing if it is an issue
in the case.3'
29 See id. at 25.
'o See id. at 24.
31 In Kentucky, counsel is given wide latitude in summation. See Collins v.
Galbraith, 494 S.W.2d 527 (Ky 1973) (finding that counsel can guard against
incorrect inferences through closing argument); Commonwealth v Reppert, 421
S.W.2d 575, 576 (Ky 1967) (holding that "[g]reat latitude is allowed in closing
arguments"); Humana, Inc. v Fairchild, 603 S.W.2d 918 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980)
(stating that it is counsel's responsibility to clarify jury instructions). In Kentucky
& I.T.R.R. Co. v. Becker's Adm 'r, 214 S.W 900 (Ky 1919), the court stated:
It is true, of course, counsel must confine their arguments to the jury to the
[VOL. 86
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C. Loss of Consortium for Children
In Giuliani v. Guiler,32 the Kentucky Supreme Court, m a four-to-three
decision,33 adopted a new cause of action - loss of parental consortium on
behalf of children whose parent is deceased (despite having declined to do
so less than two years earlier mAdams v. Miller34). In Giuliani, the dissent
argued vigorously3 5 that the court does not have the constitutional power
to create such a cause of action, a technical point that was simply ignored
by the majority 3 6 As the composition of the court changes, this issue may
be revisited.
In Giuliani, Kentucky's supreme court took the position that loss of
consortium is a common law doctrine.37 While this is true m the context of
personal injury, for obvious reasons the doctrine has never been extended
to death cases.38 In 1968, Kentucky's legislature enacted a statute providing
evidence, but this does not mean that they may not make calculations and
deductions to illustrate the result of an application of the facts as proven to
the court's instructions and the law of the case, and thus to assist the jury in
making a verdict, for such is the province and should be the purpose of
every argument to the jury.
Id. at 902. Since reduction to present value is the law of the case, counsel must be
allowed to discuss it in summation whether or not the trial court allowed expert
testimony on the issue.
32 Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318 (Ky. 1997).
33 Interestingly, one member of the majority was a special justice, a practicing
attorney who represents plaintiffs in tort litigation. The- political viability of
allowing practicing attorneys to sit on the court is beyond the scope of this writing.
However, in the opinion of this author, such a practice should not occur where the
case involves the creation or definition of causes of action.
34 Adams v. Miller, 908 S.W.2d 112 (Ky. 1995) (holding that the administrator
for the estates of tenants who died or were injured in a fire could not recover
damages for loss of parental consortium).
35 By way of disclaimer it should be noted that the author represented one of the
respondents in the case on appeal.
36 The majority treats this as an issue of legislative prerogative rather than
constitutional power. See Giuliani, 951 S.W.2d at 321.
37 See id. at 320.
38 The common law cause of action for loss of consortium of a spouse ceases
upon the death of the spouse. McGuire v. East Ky. Beverage Co., 238 S.W.2d 1020
(Ky 1951). There never has been a common law action in the context of personal
injury available to parents or children. See supra note 3 for the text of section 241
of Kentucky's Constitution, the constitutional provision vesting the legislature with
the power to define actions for death.
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for recovery of damages by a parent for loss of affection and compamon-
ship of a minor that would have been derived during the child's minority 39
Until the Giuliani decision, there was no common law cause of action for
loss of consortium. The Giuliani opinion, which allows children to recover
for the loss of affection and companionship of a parent, leaves many
questions unanswered. These questions are discussed below
1. To Whom Does the Cause ofAction Belong?
While the Giuliani opinion does not specifically address the issue of to
whom the new cause of action belongs, it does point out that a loss of
consortium claim is separate from the clain for wrongful death and belongs
to separate legal entities." Thus, it would appear that the loss of consortium
claim belongs to the minor, and if there are multiple children, each would
have his or her own claim.
2. Who May Bring the Cause ofAction?
While the opinion speaks frequently in terms of "children," it seems
clear that the intent was to limit recovery to minor children. The court used
the term "minor" twice in the opinion, once when it framed the issue on
appeal and again when it announced the adoption of the new rule. There is
a reference in the opinion to the need to "provide for the complete
development of that child,"4 and it is clear that the court considered its new
creation to be the reciprocal of the statutory cause of action for parents.42
Thus, the opinion suggests that the court intended a cause of action by and
for minors.
3. What is the Measure ofDamages?
The opinion states that the measure of damages is to be the same
measure set forth in the statute creating a clain on the part of parents.43
Thus, the measure of damages is the loss of affection and companionship. 4
39 See KY REV STAT. ANN. [hereinafter K.R.S.] § 411.135 (Michie 1992).
'o See Giuliani, 951 S.W.2d at 322 (citing Department of Educ. v. Blevins, 707
S.W.2d 782 (Ky 1986)).
41 Id. at 320.
42 See Id. at 321.
43 See id.
44 See K.R.S. § 411.135.
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However, tis issue is clouded by a statement in the opinion that "[t]he
proof of such loss and the necessary proof of monetary loss resulting
therefrom are factors to be considered by the trier of fact separate from any
wrongful death clann "45 It is likely that the reference to monetary loss
simply refers to the translation of an emotional loss into an economic
value. However, it also could be interpreted to mean that the child can
assert a claim for the cost of day care and other expenses, which would
clearly be duplicative of the damages awarded in the death action since
they would have been paid for by the parent had he or she lived. Finally,
the court was silent on the time frame for recovery of damages. For the
reasons set forth above, the likely intent was to limit recovery to the
duration of the minority just as is the case with the parental claim.
4. How Are Evidentiary Issues to Be Handled?
There is no way to predict all, or perhaps even most, of the evidentiary
issues that will arise in connection with these claims. Obviously, this ruling
is a bonanza for psychologists and psychiatrists, and surely some will
become specialists in assessing this type of loss and serve as professional
witnesses. Perhaps the most significant issue, however, will involve the
introduction of proof concerning the decedent that would not otherwise be
admissible in the wrongful death case. Because one cannot assess the loss
of affection and companionship without looking at the relationship,
evidence concerning the decedent's past, such as prior abuse of the
children, abuse of alcohol and other drugs, the amount of time spent with
the children, etc., should be competent. By the same token, the plamtiff in
the death case will have the benefit of using the party-children to invoke
sympathy in the death case, testifying at length concerning how much they
miss their parent, etc. The best rule probably would be to not allow any of
this proof andjust assume thejury understands that children will miss their
parent.
5. What is the Effect of the Statute of Limitations?
The statute of limitations is problematic because the cause of action
involves minors. Wrongful death cases that were settled, or tried and
satisfied, years ago often involved children of the decedent who were
minors at the time. These children will now try to assert a loss of consor-
tium claim. Just as with any other consortium claim, the statute of
45 Giuliani, 951 S.W.2d at 323.
1997-98] TORTS
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
limitations is one year,46 but by virtue of infancy, the statute is suspended
until the age of majority is reached.47 Thus, parties who long ago "bought
their peace" or took repose through res judicata now are faced with a brand
new claim. In addition, there is no requirement that the minor bring ns or
her action at the same time as the wrongful death action is prosecuted, or,
m the case of multiple minors, there is no reason why they would need to
be brought together, raising the possibility of two or more trials per
wrongful death. Either the court or the legislature must fashion a remedy
to this problem.48
H. PRODUCT LIABILITY
Most of the recent decisions concerning product liability law have
related to the Product Liability Act49 ("PLA"), which was enacted in
1978.50 This legislation was the original "tort reform" enacted by the
" See Floyd v Gray, 657 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Ky. 1983).
47 See K.R.S. § 413.170.
4' This exemplifies one of the reasons courts should leave legislating to the
legislature, since the court is not in a position to fully examine the ramifications of
a change in public policy
49 K.R.S. § 411.300-.350. The statute places a number of limitations on expan-
sion of product liability law. It excuses the seller from liability where the defect is
created by the alteration or modification of a product. See id. § 411.320(1). The
statute requires a hearing on relevance before the admission ofevidence concerning
subsequent remedial measures. See id. § 411.330. Finally, a middleman who was
not negligent and did not breach an express warranty is absolved from liability
where the manufacturer is identified and subject to thejunsdiction of the court. See
id. § 411.340.
The statute creates two presumptions of non-defectiveness. The first presumes
that a product is not defective if the injury occurred more than five years after the
first sale of the product or more than eight years after the date of manufacture. See
id. § 411.310(1). The second presumes that a product is not defective if prevailing
standards or the state of the art at the time of manufacture were met. See id. §
411.310(2). While both of these sections are effective statements of policy, the
creation of a presumption seems meaningless, as a practical matter, since the
burden ofproof inherent in the bringing of such a claim has the same effectwithout
regard to the application of the statute.
" Worth considenng, however, is the decision inNiehoffv. Surgidev Corp., 950
S.W.2d 816 (Ky 1997), in which the court held that state claims for negligence or
special liability against the manufacturer of intraocular lens implants were not
preempted by the Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 - 393 (1982). See Niehoff, 950 S.W.2d at 818. While an
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General Assembly Notwithstanding the length of time that has elapsed
since its enactment, the significance and validity of many sections of the
PLA remain in doubt.
A. Constitutionality of the PLA
The Kentucky Supreme Court has finally been presented with the issue
ofwhether the PLA violates the Kentucky Constitution, particularly section
54.1 In Monsanto Co. v. Reed,52 the statute passed constitutional muster on
the ground that it was not reform at all, but was instead a codification of
existing Kentucky law 53 The case, however, involved those sections of the
extensive analysis of preemption is beyond the scope of this Article, the subject
does give rise to concern about conflict between state tort law and public policy as
determined by Congress. The court noted that the purpose of the investigational
device exemption under which the implants were being used was to "encourage
research and development" Id. The effect of a finding of defect in design is that
the product should not have been placed on the market. See Nichols v. Umon
Underwear Co., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1980). Thus, while the federal
government has established a policy to encourage experimentation, the state is
imposing liability on the theory that the manufacturer is presumed to know the
likely results of the experimentation. Under such circumstances, even if preemption
technically is not involved, the state should seriously consider comity.
"i This section provides as follows: "The General Assembly shall have no
power to limit the amount to be recovered for mjunes resulting m death or for
injuries to person or property." KY. CONST. § 54.
Monsanto Co. v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1997).
5 See id. at 815. The construction given to section 54 has vaned through the
years. In Ludwig v. Johnson, 49 S.W.2d 347 (Ky. 1932), the court developed the
concept of "jural rights," holding that it was the purpose of section 54 to preserve
the common law right of a citizen harmed by the negligence of another to sue and
recover for the mjury. See id. at 349. The court held that the enactment of a "guest
statute" was unconstitutional on that ground. In Happy v. Erwin, 330 S.W.2d 412
(Ky 1959), the court struck down a statute granting city employees immunity from
personal liability. See id. at 414. The court noted that there was an immunity in
favor of charitable institutions, but that such liability did not exist before 1891 and
therefore section 54 had no application. See id. In Fireman's Fund Ins. v.
Government Emp. Ins. Co., 635 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1982), overruled by Perkins v.
Northeastern Log Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1991), the court observed:
Assuming, however, but without so deciding, that the general theory of
indemnity as grounds for a cause of action cannot be legislated away, still
the specific issue in any case is whether the facts of the case would have
established a cause of action under that theory at that time. Today, for
example, we behold the theory of negligence having burgeoned into
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PLA that preclude recovery where the product was modified or altered,54
and was decided in the context of an action for negligence, rather than
warranty or special liability Accordingly, there remains room for
challenges to other provisions of the PLA.
B. Scope of the PLA
Notwithstanding the fact that the language of the PLA is clear,"5 the
court in Monsanto found it necessary to affirm that the PLA applies to all
product liability actions without regard to the legal theory asserted. 6 In that
case, the plaintiffs alleged negligence m the supplying of a chattel. Thus,
liability without fault m products liability cases, but it would be absurd to
contend that such liability would have been countenanced in 1891.
Id. at 477 Thus, a statute would only be unconstitutional to the extent that it
limited or abolished a cause of action based on facts that were actionable in 1891.
To confuse the issue, however, the court in Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky.
1973), held that the question was not whether the facts stated a claim in 1891, but
rather whether they stated a claim at the time of the enactment of the statute. See
id. at 224. Then, ten years later, the court reviewed the same statute in Carney v.
Moody, 646 S.W.2d 40 (Ky 1983), overruled by Perkins v Northeastern Log
Homes, 808 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1991), and, without overruling Saylor, held that the
key time is 1891. See id. at 41. Finally, in Tablerv. Wallace, 704 S.W.2d 179 (Ky.
1986), the court once again reviewed the same statute, striking it down on other
grounds, see id. at 187, and in so doing declined to expound on the conflict
between Saylor and Carney. The latter appears to express the current state of the
law on this issue. A remaining issue to be determined is whether the existence of
a pre-1891 cause of action based on a particular state of facts necessarily
invalidates the statute in its entirety, or whether the statute is invalid only as applied
to those causes of action.
54See K.R.S. § 411.320(1), (2) (Michie 1982).
11 Section 411.300(1) states:
As used in KRS 411.310 to 411.340, a "product liability action" shall
include any action brought for or on account of personal injury, death or
property damage causedby orresulting from the manufacture, construction,
design, formulation, development of standards, preparation, processing,
assembly, testing, listing, certifying, warning, instructing, marketing,
advertising, packaging or labeling of any product.
Id. § 411.300(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992).
56 See Monsanto, 950 S.W.2d at 814.
7 See id. at 812. The plaintiffs' theory of recovery was based on section 388 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides as follows:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to
use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use
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whether the plaintiff alleges an injury caused by negligence, breach of
warranty, or special liability, the provisions of the PLA and the defenses
included therein are applicable.
C. Alterations and Modifications of the Product
In one more example of the volatility of tort law in recent years,
Kentucky courts cannot seem to come to a consensus on the provisions in
the PLA that preclude recovery where the user has altered or modified the
product.58 In Caterpillar, Inc. v. Brock,5 9 the Kentucky Supreme Court
the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable
use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for
which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be
dangerous for the use for wuch it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is
supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to mform them of its dangerous
condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965). While this section's scope is
broader than special liability under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, warranty under section 355.2, and the PLA, all of which apply only to
sellers, Monsanto did involve a seller, and given the court's ruling that the PLA
was merely a codification of prior law, the same rules should apply to a non-seller.
58 Section 411.320(1) provides as follows: "In any products liability action, a
manufacturer shall be liable only for the personal injury, death or property damage
that would have occurred if the product had been used in its original, unaltered and
unmodified condition." K.R.S. § 411.320(1).
Section 411.320(2) provides as follows:
In any products liability action, if the plaintiff performed an unauthorized
alteration or an unauthorized modification, and such alteration or
modification was a substantial cause of the occurrence that caused injury or
damage to the plaintiff, the defendant shall not be liable whether or not said
defendant was at fault or the product was defective.
Id. § 411.320(2).
For purposes of this discussion, the important distinction between these two
subsections is that subsection (1) governs the liability of a seller regardless of who
made the alteration or modification, whereas subsection (2) relates to unauthorized
alterations or modifications made by the plaintiff. The legislature should share in
any blame for any misconstruction of these statutes since on the surface, subsection
(2) is redundant. There is no need for an affirmative defense of alteration or
modification by the plaintiff if there is no liability in the first instance under
subsection (1).




considered the relationship between section 411.320(1) (no liability if
product was altered) and K.R.S. § 411.182(1) (several liability applies to
product liability cases)60 rathe context of a certified question received from
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.61 In that case the
plaintiffwas an employee of Great Western Coal Company andwas injured
when the brakes failed on a bulldozer manufactured by Caterpillar.6
Caterpillar had filed a third-party complaint against Great Western alleging
failure to observe routine maintenance and care, which if true would
constitute an alteration or modification.63 Great Western was dismissed
from the case,6 but the parties agreed that, assuming there was sufficient
evidence, Great Western would be included m the instructions for purposes
of apportionment, 6s and the jury did in fact apportion some fault against
Great Western.66 The court held that the enactment of section 411.182,
60 This statute establishes several liability in tort cases including product
liability cases. See K.R.S. § 411.182(1).
61 See Brock, 915 S.W.2d at 751.
62See d. at 751-52.
63See zd. at 752.
Great Western had filed bankruptcy. See id.6
1 See id. The application of several liability has been permitted m Kentucky
since 1839, Central Passenger Ry. Co. v. Kuhn, 6 S.W 441,446-47 (Ky. 1888),
when section 454.040 was enacted. At that time, the statute applied only to party
defendants, Nix v. Jordan, 532 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Ky. 1975), overruled by Dix &
Assoc. Pipeline Contractors, Inc. v. Key, 799 S.W.2d 24 (Ky 1990), but it was
subsequently extended to defendants who had settled, Orr v Coleman, 455 S.W.2d
59, 61 (Ky. 1970), and to defendants who had been dismissed from the suit for any
other reason, Daulton v. Reed, 538 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Ky 1976). With the adoption
of comparative fault mHilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713,719 (Ky. 1984), the court
worked to merge the two concepts, and by the time section 411.182 was effective,
the court had fashioned a common law rule regarding several liability independent
of section 454.040. See Floyd v. Carlisle Constr. Co., 758 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Ky.
1988). See generally John M. Rogers, Apportionment in Kentucky After
Comparative Negligence, 75 KY. L.J. 102 (1986-87). The only difference between
the common law rule and section 411.182 is the application of comparative
negligence to product liability cases and other torts.
66 See Brock, 915 S.W.2d at 752. Further clouding the opinion is the fact that
Caterpillar sought an instruction advising the jury that there could be no liability
on the part of Caterpillar if any person performed an unauthorized alteration, which
would include the failure to observe routine maintenance and care of the bulldozer.
See id. The trial court declined to give the instruction on the ground that there was
insufficient evidence that Great Western altered or modified the bulldozer by
failing to observe routine maintenance and care. The trial court did, however, give
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which calls for apportionment among tortfeasors who are parties or have
been released, repealed section 411.320(1) by implication.'
Histoncally, negligence on the part of a plaintiff was a complete
defense to recovery 6 8 By the same token, Kentucky recognized several
liability among tortfeasor parties and tortfeasors who had been dismissed
from the case. 9 Kentucky first recognized the special liability imposed on
a seller of a product for physical harm to the consumer, as set forth m
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, in Dealers Transport
Co. v. Battery Distributing Co.7 ° While Kentucky never adopted such a
position, there was a trend m other jurisdictions allowing recovery for
"foreseeable misuse,"'71 which had the effect of eliminating contributory
negligence as a defense m product liability cases. One of the purposes of
the PLA was to ensure that this trend was not followed m Kentucky 72 In
1984, the Kentucky Supreme Court mHilen v. Hays73 adopted comparative
fault, but because the PLA specifically referred to "contributory negli-
gence" as a defense, the court held m 1986 that Hilen did not apply to
product liability cases.74 In 1988 the legislature enacted section 411.182,15
which specifically applied apportionment of fault to product liability
cases.76 Thus, there can be no doubt that the enactment of section 411.182
an instruction allowing the jury to find that Great Western failed to exercise
ordinary care in the inspection, maintenance, and service of the bulldozer, and the
jury found against Great Western in this respect. See id. The opinion gives no clue
as to what evidence, if any, on which this instruction was based. The tral court
apparently found that there was evidence of a failure to observe routine
maintenance and care on the part of Great Western (or no instruction would have
been given), but that such failure on a qualitative basis did not arise to the level of
an alteration or modification. See id. The fact is, however, that the statute does not
require any such analysis and is absolute in its terms. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v
Rice, 775 S.W.2d 924 (Ky Ct. App. 1988).67 See Brock, 915 S.W.2d at 753.
68 See Hilen, 673 S.W.2d at 714.
69 See Daulton, 538 S.W.2d at 308.
70 Dealers Transp. Co. v Battery Distr. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441, 446-47 (Ky
1965).
71SeeFredenckE. Felder, Annotation, ProductsLtability: Ateration ofProduct
After it Leaves Hands ofManufacturer or Seller as Affecting Liabilityfor Product-
Caused Harm, 41 A.L.R.3D 1251 (1972).
72 See K.R.S. § 411.320(2), (3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992).
73Hilen v Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1984).
74See Reda Pump Co. v Finck, 713 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Ky 1986).
75 K.R.S. § 411.182.
76 While the obvious purpose ofsection 411.182's emphasis on product liability
actions was to place the effect of negligence on the part of the plaintiff on an equal
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(which calls for apportionment of fault among tortfeasors) didin fact repeal
or at least modify section 411.320(3) (which releases a defendant from
liability if the plaintiff s failure to exercise ordinary care was a substantial
cause of the injury) and section 411.320(2) (which releases a defendant
from liability if the plaintiff has altered or modified the product and such
alteration or modification was a substantial cause of the injury). However,
there is no rational basis for concluding that the enactment of section
411.182 had any effect on section 411.320(1), since it has nothing to do
with the conduct of the plaintiff, but rather defines the circumstances under
which the seller is liable in the first instance.
A mere fourteen months after deciding Brock, the Kentucky Supreme
Court implied with its Monsanto decision,7 7 the converse conclusion of
Brock by holding that alteration or mutilation of the chattel precluded
recovery for the plaintiff.7 In Monsanto the defendant had manufactured
and sold electrical transformers that contained polychlormated biphenyls
("PCB"). After the manufacture of the transformers, the use of PCBs was
banned by Congress. 79 After the useful life of the transformers was
exhausted, they were sold for salvage, and in the course of the salvage
operations, which involved removal of copper coils within the transform-
ers, the plaintiffs allegedly were exposed to PCBs.8 ° Of the thirty-seven
plaintiffs, five proceeded presumably alleging special liability under
section 402A. Summaryjudgement was granted based on the PLA, and the
judgment became final without an appeal."' The remaining plaintiffs
proceeded under a negligence theory, arguing that the PLA did not apply
In affirming the summary judgment against those plaintiffs, the court
observed that it has long been the law in Kentucky that a manufacturer is
footing with its effect in other cases sounding m tort, the statute is significant m a
couple of additional respects. First, its enactment served as a ratification of the
adoption of comparative negligence in Hilen. Second, it complemented section
411.340 and formally ended the inefficient result typified by Embs v. Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co., 528 S.W.2d 703 (Ky 1975), wherein a retailer was held strictly liable
but was allowed to seek indemnification from the entity that sold the product to
him, even though there was no showing of fault.
77 See Monsanto Co. v. Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811 (Ky 1997). The Monsanto Court
found section 411.320(1), (2) to be constitutional, which would have been un-
necessary had the provisions been repealed.
78 See id. at 814.




not liable for injuries resulting from mutilation or alteration of a chattel, 2
andthatthePLA codifies tis longstanding principle.83 The Monsanto court
affirmed the summary judgment without suggesting that there was any
question as to the validity of the PLA as it relates to alteration or modifica-
tion of the product.
Given the conflicting opinions from the Kentucky Supreme Court on
the role of alterations and modifications of products, the question arises as
to just what is the liability of a seller of goods in this context. There was
not a significant change in the composition of the court in the fourteen
months separating the two opinions, 4 and thus the question remains as to
the status of section 411.320(1). The language of the statutes involved
makes the correct result obvious. Section 411.320(1) simply has nothing to
do with the conduct of the plaintiff and therefore nothing to do with the
plaintiffs comparative negligence. Rather, it defines the circumstances
under which the seller is liable and stands for the proposition that where a
product has been altered or modified, whether by the plaintiff or a third
person, there is no defect for which the seller can be held liable.
D. Multiple Theories and Jury Instructions
The Monsanto holding that the PLA applies to all theories of recovery
must, however, be viewed in light of the holding in Clark v. Hauck
Manufacturng Co."s In Clark, the plaintiff was killed while using an oil-
fired, hand-held torch. The estate claimed that the flame went out, causing
a mist of oil to spew from the torch onto the decedent, and then reignited,
causing severe bums. 6 The torch came with a nose cone that could be
removed easily, as it was held in place by three screws. The nose cone had
been removed on the date in question. Engineers forthe manufacturerknew
that, without the nose cone, a strong wind could blow out the flame. 7 The
estate's claim was that the decedent should have been warned of a
foreseeable misuse.
8 8
82See id. at 814 (citing Collins Co. v Rowe, 428 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Ky. 1968)).
83See id.
4The only difference was that the author of Brock had died before Monsanto
was decided. Both opinions were unanimous.
" Clark v Hauck Mfg. Co., 910 S.W.2d 247 (Ky 1995).
16 See id. at 250.
17 See Id. at 250-51.
8' See id. at 251. It is this type of case that has caused the clamor for federal tort
reform in the country. In the sense that the term "foreseeable" is used in this case,
all misuses are foreseeable. The issue should instead be whether the misuse is in the
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The opinion does not set forth the actual instruction given by the trial
court, but it appears that the jury was instructed that the plaintiff was
required to prove a defective design and a failure to warn. The court held
that the plaintiff was required only to prove one or the other, and that the
instruction "improperly linked two distinct theories of recovery 89 The net
effect of the ruling, however, is to require that a theory of recovery be
submitted to the jury twice. If the issue is submitted to the jury under a
defective design theory using an mstruction such as that authorized in
Nichols v. Union Underwear,0 then the jury has already been instructed on
the warning issue. The decision to include or exclude a warning is part and
parcel of the design process, and whether an adequate warning is given is
a factor to be considered by the jury in determining whether the product is
unreasonably dangerous. 9' Thus, to give both the Nichols instruction and
a warning instruction such as that approved in Post v. American Cleaning
Equipment Corp.92 violates the well-settled rule that instructions should not
emphasize one theory of the case. Only where the sole issue for the jury's
determination is the adequacy of a warning should the Post instruction be
given.
IV DRAM SHOP LIABILITY
Until recently, the Kentucky Supreme Court consistently rejected
attempts to inpose liability on anyone for the furmshing of liquor. In the
context of a man who literally drank himself to death, the court held that
such an injury was not a foreseeable result of furnishing liquor.93 In 1968,
scope of uses for which the manufacturer should, as a matter of policy, be held
responsible. For some reason, when the otherwise sober and prudent "reasonable
man" finds himself in the proximity of a product, he becomes an idiot, and the
courts have charged manufacturers and sellers with the duty of protecting him from
himself. This is the very reason the legislature established a contrary policy by
enacting section 411.320(1), which was largely ignored in this case.
8
9 Id.
90 Nichols v Union Underwear Co., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Ky 1980).
9' See id.
92Post v American Cleaning Equip. Corp., 437 S.W.2d 516, 522 (Ky 1968).
93SeeBritton'sAdm'rv Samuels, 136 S.W 143, 144 (Ky. 1911), where itwas
alleged that liquor was furmished to a person known to be intoxicated and an
inebriate, therefore violating a statute which specifically provided for a civil action
when notice had been given to the tavern keeper. See id. at 143. The court held that
the death was caused not by the sale of the liquor but by the drinking of it. See id.
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the first reported attempt was made to impose on the seller of liquor
liability for an automobile accident. In Pike v. George,94 this issue was
before the court in the context of a motion to dismiss.95 There is nothing in
the Pike opinion that could justify a determination that the Pike court
authorized an action for negligence or in any way modified prior law 
96
The Kentucky Supreme Court recognized such liability in Grayson
Fraternal Order ofEagles v. Claywell.97 Under the holding of that case, to
recover, a plaintiff must show that (1) the tavern keeper knew or should
have known "that he is serving 'a person actually or apparently under the
influence of alcoholic beverages"' and (2) "that there is a reasonable
likelihood that upon leaving the tavern that person will operate a motor
at 144. In order to be actionable, the court required some basis for concluding that:
[t]he sale was made for the purpose of injuring [the decedent], or with the
knowledge that [the decedent] intended to drink of it to such an extent as to
produce injury or death, or that [the tavern keeper] had reasonable grounds
to believe that deceased could not be safely trusted with the whiskey.
Id. In Nally v. Blandford, 291 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1956), the court allowed a
complaint to stand where it was specifically alleged that the furnisher knew that the
patron was intoxicated and knew that the patron intended to continue to drink. The
court made a point of characterizing the tort as an intentional one. The same
rationale was applied where the patron, after the sale of the liquor, shot a third
person. See Waller's Adn'r v Collinsworth, 137 S.W 766 (Ky 1911). The court
again found difficulty with causation, holding that an intentional battery was not
a reasonably foreseeable result of serving alcohol. See id. at 767
9' Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968).
9 The complaint alleged it was a willful and malicious violation of section
244.080 to sell alcohol to a minor. See id. at 626-27 Emphasizing that malice was
alleged, and that the facts and circumstances were not known, the court held that
it could not say that there were no circumstances under which the seller could be
liable, and accordingly found that the complaint stated a claim. See id. at 629. This
result is consistent with the holding in Nally, which required intentional conduct.
See Nally, 291 S.W.2d at 835.
96 See Pike, 434 S.W.2d at 629
97 Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v Claywell, 736 S.W.2d 328 (Ky. 1987).
Grayson involved an unlicensed vendor of liquor situated in a dry county There
was proof that the patron, Horton, came into the bar "a little tight" and was served
four or five double shots of whiskey in about an hour-and-a-half. Horton left at
closing time, very drunk, when the bartender forced him out of the bar and into his
car. While dnving intoxicated, Horton collided with a police car, causing the




vehicle.""8 The opinion is not clear at all as to the role to be played by
statutes regulating the sale of alcohol.99
In 1988, the legislature enacted section 413.241 in direct response to
the Grayson opmion10 This statute deals with four issues. In the first
paragraph, the statute makes a legislative finding that the consumption of
alcohol, rather than the furmshing of alcohol, is the proximate cause of any
9 Id. at 334 (quoting K.R.S. § 244.080(2)). While the opinion dealt factually
with furnishing liquor to an intoxicated person, presumably it also would apply to
the furnishing of liquor to a minor so long as the second element were present. See
infra note 99.
9 Section 244.080 proscribes the selling of alcohol to four categones of
purchasers: (1) a minor; (2) a person actually or apparently intoxicated; (3) a
habitual drunkard; and (4) a person known to have been convicted of a felony or
of a misdemeanor attributable to the use of alcohol. See K.R.S. § 244.080 (Michie
1994). This is a penal statute regulating persons holding licenses to sell alcohol; it
is silent as to whether it gives nse to a civil cause of action. See id. It also should
be noted that intent and knowledge are not elements required by the statute. See
Duncan v Commonwealth, 179 S.W.2d 899, 899 (Ky 1944) (interpreting the
predecessor to K.R.S. § 244.080).
In one part of the Grayson opinion, the court noted that section 244.080 reflects
a standard of care, while a few paragraphs further on, the court indicated that where
the vendor is licensed, a violation of the statute would be negligence per se. See
Grayson, 736 S.W.2d at 333. The court went on to rely on section 286 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which sets forth the circumstances under which the
court may adopt a statute as a definition of the standard of conduct. See id. at 334;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 286 (1965). It is doubtful that section 286 has
any true application to section 244.080 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. The
Restatement provision requires a relationship between the purpose of the statute
and the harm in question. See id. This statute has been in existence much longer
than the current concern about drunk driving. While it seems clear that the statute
may now have the effect of protecting the public from injury, it seems equally clear
that the intent of the statute was to protect the morals, not the persons, of the public.
In short, while the statute may be helpful in articulating a standard, it does not
appear that a violation of the statute can properly be deemed negligence per se. The
Grayson opinion supports this view. For example, since the statute does not require
notice or knowledge, it may be violated if a person who is actually intoxicated is
served, even if he does not appear to be intoxicated; conversely, it may also be
violated if the person appears to be intoxicated but actually is not. According to the
Grayson opinion, however, either circumstance would not be sufficient to find
negligence since it must also be shown that the tavern keeper knew or should have
known of the patron's state of intoxication. See Grayson, 736 S.W.2d at 334.
'0o See K.R.S. § 413.241 (Michie 1992).
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injury to the drinker or a third person."' The second paragraph sets forth
the circumstances under which one may be liable for furnishing alcohol to
an intoxicated adult. In order for liability to be imposed there must be a
showing that "a reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances
should know that the person served is already intoxicated at the time of
serving." 2 This section does not address service to minors and specifies
only licensed vendors of liquors.0 The statute's third paragraph states that
the intoxicated person is primarily liable for injuries suffered by third
persons."° In the fourth paragraph, the statute provides that the limitation
of liability does not apply to any person who contributes to intoxication by
force or misrepresentation.
0 5
On its face, the statute makes no sense. In paragraph four, the statute
is described as a limitation of liability, but if furnshmg alcohol is not a
proximate cause, as stated in paragraph one, then no cause of action for
negligence can exist.1 06 Yet, in paragraph two, circumstances are described
under which liability can be inposed. 7 If the statute is to be read as a
whole, one must conclude that the legislature has repealed Grayson,
replacing it with a modified dram shop statute. Under this statute, if that be
the case, it is not necessary to show that the furnmishing of liquor was a
cause, but only that the intoxication was a cause. 108
10 See id. § 413.241(1).
'02 Id. § 413.241(2).
3 id.
See id. § 413.241(3).
See id. § 413.241(4).
See id. § 413.241(1), (4).
,07 id. § 413.241(2).
208 This construction would, m some respects, expand potential liability For
example, consider the case where a person enters an establishment and is already
intoxicated. Suppose he is served one beer, leaves the premises, and is involved in
an accident. He is found to have a blood alcohol level of 0.20. Under the common
law rule of Grayson, the furnisher would have a strong argument that the one
additional drink was not a cause of the accident because even without that drink,
the patron would still have been substantially impaired, and may very well have
been involved in the accident m any event. Under section 413.241 this argument
would not appear to be viable, since the issue under the statute is whether the
intoxication was a cause of the accident.
Assuming that the intention of the legislature was as described above, the
question remains as to whether a cause of action continues to exist regarding
furnishing alcohol to a minor. Since section 413.241 provides no such cause of
action, and since the furnishing of liquor is not a proximate cause of a subsequent
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Recently, m Watts v. K, S & H, '09 Kentucky's supreme court applied
Grayson to the sale of alcohol to a mnor."0 No mention is made of the
dram shop statute, possibly due to the fact that the cause of action accrued
long before the enactment of that statute."' The case is most signifi-
cant for its extension of the element requiring foreseeable use of an auto-
mobile.
112
The plaintiff received serious injuries in an automobile accident
involving an intoxicated teenage driver, Neal. Neal and three friends had
skipped school the day of the accident, and one of the friends purchased a
case of beer and a pint of rum from the defendant. They spent the rest of
the day visiting with friends andplaymg pool, and it was unclear how much
alcohol each teen consumed. At first, Neal was not driving. The boys
returned to school at dismissal time andthen Neal leftthe school in his own
car. The accident occurred while Neal was driving his own car.' 13 The court
simply held that reasonable mmds could differ as to whether the scenario
was "clearly unforeseeable.""' 4 Unfortunately, the burden is not on the
defendant to show that the conduct could not have been foreseen. The test,
rather, is whether the defendant had reason to believe the purchaser would
be driving an automobile while intoxicated." 5 There are no facts revealed
in the opinion that would have put the defendant on notice that Neal would
be driving. The net result of the opinion is that one can mfer the second and
key element in Grayson from the mere fact that liquor was purchased. In
other words, if left to stand, Watts stands for strict liability in the sale of
liquor, which clearly was not the intent of the court in Grayson. It remains
to be seen what the Kentucky Supreme Court will make of the statute.
injury, see d., it would appear that this cause of action has been abrogated. The
statute also appears to retain the no-liability rule for social hosts and in fact extends
the no-liability rule to business events held by a non-licensed entity. See d.
Furthermore, under Grayson, it must be shown that the furnisher had reason to
believe that the drinker would drive an automobile, see Grayson, 736 S.W.2d at
334, but the statute includes no such requirement. The statute, by its terms, applies
to all injuries, not just those suffered m an automobile accident. See K.R.S. §
413.241.
109 Watts v. K, S & H, 44 Ky. L. Summary No. 11, at 37 (1997).




3 See zd. at 38.





Kentucky appellate courts have recently had several occasions to
consider the concept of duty, and while a detailed discussion of that
concept is beyond the scope of this work, those cases set the backdrop for
a brief discussion of a key component of duty winch is often misstated in
practice.
In Sheehan v. UnitedServicesAutomobileAssoczation, I6 the plaintiff's
decedent placed a handgun to ins head and accidently pulled the trigger.
The gun was supplied by a friend who had removed it from his father's
home. The plaintiff argued that the father's homeowner insurer had a duty
to screen applicants and educate them as to safe gun use.' 7 The Sheehan
court quoted the sophistry from the Grayson opinion, "'liability for
negligence expresses a universal duty by all to all."'s The court observed
that duty is not as universal as the saying may imply, stating "[h]owever,
and this is a point frequently overlooked by some, the duty to exercise
ordinary care is commensurate with the circumstances. ' 9 The circum-
stance most relevant to the nature of the duty owed is whether the risk was
created by the conduct of the defendant or by another, and the issue in the
latter instance is whether the defendant should have protected the plaintiff
from that risk.
Even in the context of risk created by the defendant, the Grayson
statement is not entirely correct, since the duty to exercise ordinary care
extends only to those within the foreseeable scope of the risk created.'
20
Furthermore, it has no application where the risk was created by one other,
than the defendant. In fact, the general rule is that there is no duty to protect
others,' with the exception being where a duty to protect arises out of the
'16Sheehan v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 913 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).
117 See id. at 6.
.. d. (quoting GraysonFratemal OrderofEagles v. Claywell, 736 S.W.2d 328,
330 (Ky. 1987)).
"9 Id. The Sheehan court further stated:
The statement of whether or not a duty exists is but a conclusion of whether
a plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendants
conduct. The existence of a duty is an issue of law, and a court, when




20 See Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586, 595 (Ky 1967).
m See Grimes v Hettinger, 566 S.W.2d 769, 775 (Ky Ct. App. 1978).
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special relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff,'" and the
extent of that duty depends in turn on the nature of the relationship." The
nature of the relationship is critical to any analysis of duty but is mcreas-
ingly ignored or misunderstood. 24
In the context of the duty to protect, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
reaffirmed on at least two occasions that a licensee is owed no duty as to
dangers that are open and obvious. 2 ' In Scifres v. Kraft, a social guest
dived into a swimming pool and struck his head on the other side, causing
quadriplegia.' 26 The court held that there was no duty to warn a guest of a
condition that was readily apparent.' This should apply to most other
cases involving depth, particularly those involving above-ground pools.
The Scifres court also affirmed the right of a landowner to allow his
guests to enjoy themselves at a party The plaintiff argued that the owner
failed to supervise and control the conduct of his guests. The party was
attended by about forty friends and coworkers, who brought their own
alcohol. Some of the guests mixed a concoction called "jungle juice" in a
plastic garbage can, which was observed by the owner. The plaintiff
consumed two glasses of the "jungle juice" and three or four beers while
at the party, and had imbibed several beers at a local bar before coming to
the party Two men were swimming in the pool, properly attired, when a
" See id.
" For example, the existence of an economic relationshup, such as m the case
of a business visitor or public invitee, supports a greater duty toprotect than does
the relationship between the possessor of land and a mere licensee. See Bowers v.
Schenley Distillers, Inc., 469 S.W.2d 565, 567 (Ky 1971).
124 In fact, Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, 736 S.W.2d 328
(Ky 1987), provides a perfect example of this. In order to reach its conclusion, the
Grayson court necessarily must have determined that the risk was created by the
tavern keeper who furnished the alcohol to the one who intended to drive. Yet, m
the same opinion, the court stated that its holding would not extend to social guests,
who are licensees. See id. at 335. Furthermore, many would argue that the risk was
actually created by the person who drank and drove, and under that analysis there
would be no duty to third persons on the highway who have no relationship with
the tavern keeper. This nature-of-relationship analysis only applies when the issue
is a duty to protect from a risk created by a third person. See Scifres v Kraft, 916
S.W.2d 779,782 n. 1 (Ky Ct. App. 1996). Thus, by failing to address the key issue
underlying any analysis of duty, the result turns out to be internally inconsistent.
"2 See Scifres v Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky Ct. App. 1996); see also
Collins v Rocky Knob Assoc., 911 S.W.2d 608, 611-12 (Ky Ct. App. 1996).
126 See Scifres, 916 S.W.2d at 780.
'
2 7 See id. at 781.
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thirdjumped into the pool naked. Someone teased the plaintiff about being
afraid to get his hair wet, and it was at that point that he dived into the pool
and sustained his injury 128 The court noted that the duty to control the
behavior of guests is premised on knowledge of the ability to control the
guests and knowledge of the need and opportunity to do so. 129 The court
held, however, that the guests' behavior was not the type of behavior that
gives rise to a duty "I Rather, the behavior must pose a physical risk to the
mvoluntary or unsuspecting victim or innocent bystander."'
The Kentucky Supreme Court likewise reviewed the standard of
liability for injuries among participants in a sporting event in Hoke v.
Cullinan.3 2 The plaintiff was a player in a tennis match and was struck in
the eye by a tennis ball that was being returned to the server.'33 The court
held that the failure to plead recklessness, even though play was stopped at
the time, was fatal to his claim. 34 The court held that the standard of care
remains the same throughout the game even though play frequently is
temporarily stopped as a routine part of the game.1
35
VI. SUDDEN EMERGENCY
The Kentucky Court of Appeals rendered an opinion in Bass v.
Williams,3' which, although not particularly recent, deserves discussion
and review The Bass court held that a sudden-emergency instruction was
no longer appropriate since Kentucky's adoption of comparative negli-
gence. 37 What should be obvious is that the sudden-emergency instruction
relates to the imposition of liability on the tortfeasor, and has nothing
whatsoever to do with the liability accorded to the negligence of the
plaintiff. In fact, a sudden-emergency instruction also applies to the
conduct of the plaintiff, and its application does not require that the
plaintiff be negligent at all.
38
12 See id. at 780.
129 See id. at 782.
130 See id.
131 See id.
32 Hoke v Cullinan, 914 S.W.2d 335 (Ky 1996).
133 See Id. at 336.
134 See id. at 339 (following the view set forth in section 500 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965)).
135 See id.
136 Bass v Williams, 839 S.W.2d 559 (Ky Ct. App. 1992).
'37 See id. at 563.
3 See Bowers v. Schenley Distillers, Inc., 469 S:W.2d 565, 570 (Ky. 1971).
TORTS
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The court did not suggest that the sudden-emergency doctrine'39 was
no longer part of the law of negligence. Rather, it has the effect of excusing
what would otherwise be a breach of duty 140 The rule advocated by the
Bass court would, in some cases, amount to the direction of a verdict
against a party who was not even at fault. Such a holding obviously cannot
be allowed to stand.
VII. SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE
The Kentucky Supreme Court in Monsanto Co. v. Reed 4' declined to
adopt a cause of action for spoliation. 42 The court held that where a party
has deliberately destroyed evidence, the remedy is to be found in eviden-
tiary rules and missing-evidence instructions to the jury 14 In most cases,
tis remedy seems complete, but offers no relief in the event of destruction
of evidence, with knowledge of the claim or defense to which the evidence
may be relevant, by a third person. For example, if documents that may
have supported a defense have been destroyed, it would hardly be just to
instruct the jury as to any presumption since the plaintiff had no part in the
destruction, and absent that defense, the defendant may fmdhnnselfsubject
to a judgment without liability In such a case, it seems that there needs to
be some additional remedy for the plaintiff who loses a cause of action or
39 The sudden-emergency doctrine serves to define the standard of care where
a party is confronted with an emergency situation not of his creation. See, e.g.,
Weichhand v Garlinger, 447 S.W.2d 606 (Ky 1969). The doctrine recogizes that
"[ain ordinarily reasonable and prudent man is not prone to remain calm, cool and
collected m an emergency, and one so imperiled is not required to make the
decision which seems soundest in light of subsequent circumstances." Smith v
Roberts, 268 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Ky 1953).
,40 For example, it is a violation of a statute for an automobile driver to leave
the right lane where there is an obstruction ahead, and thus to do so is negligence
per se. See K.R.S. § 189.300(1) (Michie 1997). Absent a sudden-emergency
instruction, it matters not why this violation occurred. The existence of an
emergency excuses the operator from compliance with the statute.
'4' Monsanto Co. v Reed, 950 S.W.2d 811 (Ky 1997).
142 See id. at 815.
'4 See id., see also Tinsley v Jackson, 771 S.W.2d 331, 332 (Ky 1989)
(discussing use of missing-evidence instruction where evidence has been lost by
Commonwealth); Sanborn v Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534,539-40 (Ky. 1988)
(approving instruction that allowed jury to draw inference favorable to defendant
from destruction of evidence by prosecutor).
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a defendant who loses a valid defense by reason of the intentional
destruction of evidence by a third person.
VIII. ROLE OF OSHA REGULATIONS
The Kentucky Supreme Court has once again had the opportunity to
address the role that OSHA regulations play in civil litigation, even though
the enabling statutes at both the federal'" and state 145 levels specifically
state that OSHA regulations are not designed to change the common law 146
In Carman v. Dunaway Timber Co.,'47 an independent logger was mjured
on the defendant's premises when logs rolled off a truck.148 The jury found
against the plaitiff, who argued on appeal that the violation of an OSHA
regulation concerning the release of binders constituted negligence per
se. 14 The court rejected this contention on the ground that the plamtiffwas
not an employee and therefore was not within the class of persons for
whose benefit the regulation was promulgated.'50 However, the court did
express approval of the introduction of the regulations into the record as
evidence of the standard of care.' Obviously, the mere introduction of
such evidence affects the common law contrary to the specific provisions
of the enabling statute, and the court at no time addressed this conflict.
' See 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1994).
145 K.R.S. § 338.021(2) (Michie 1995).
'46 See 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1994); K.R.S. § 338.021(2). Kentucky's statute'
provides as follows:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner
affect any worker's compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in
any manner the common-law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of
employers or employees, under any law with respect to injuries, diseases,
or death of employes arising out of, or m the course of employment.
Id. (emphasis added).
'41 Carman v. Dunaway Timber Co., 949 S.W.2d 569 (Ky 1997).
48 See id.
141 See id. at 569-70.
See id. at 570.
' See id. at 571. Actually, the Carman court stated that proof concerning
OSHA regulations was admissible to controvert evidence the defendant had
introduced concerning custom. It remains open whether OSHA regulations are
admissible where there is no proof offered concerning custom. In any event, the
court did not explain how the regulations could be introduced for any purpose and
not "affect" the common law.
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